2 and operational environment, because -bulk water is still foraged on the modern battlefield.‖ 3 The Environment
Only three percent of the world's water resources are fresh water and only one percent of this water is readily available for consumption, agriculture, and industry. The remaining two percent is icebound in the polar ice-caps or in deep-ground water aquifers and inaccessible. Consequently, the world relies upon precipitation, rivers, streams and swamps as sources for fresh water, with rivers being the primary source. 4 The other ninety-seven percent is the world's salt water oceans. This water is possible to desalinize. However, desalinization requires -large amounts of energy as well as specialized, expensive infrastructure, making it very costly‖ to produce as a viable source of water. 5 Thus, fresh water scarcity, especially in the Middle East, Africa, and South Central Asia could have significant impact on regional and international stability, negatively affecting United States national security and economic interests.
Political realities compound the challenges. Failed States in Africa, such as Somalia, where access to fresh water and the drought has had significant impact on stability, have become safe havens for terrorist and criminal elements that pose a direct threat to American security. In Asia, -the nation's strategic priorities and interests will increasingly emanate from the Asia-Pacific region.‖ 6 The Middle East, Africa and AsiaPacific regions have considerable water scarcity and the Middle East and Africa are arid environments.
The Army must enable current and future forces to operate in arid and waterdepleted environments. The Army should also apply the lessons learned from the last ten years of conflict in an arid environment to its current doctrine. The Army must also prepare to conduct operations in an austere, arid environment with little to no hostnation support or viable infrastructure. This environment consists of -over populated megacities with a young population willing to use violence to achieve goals.‖ 7 Its arid nature requires increased water consumption, production and distribution to sustain army forces. The availability of water sources, viable lines of communications (LOC), and the ability of sustainment forces to defend themselves against hybrid threats become critical planning factors for logistics planners.
Doctrine
Hybrid threats and battlefield geometry pose the greatest impediment to successful sustainment operations. Hybrid threats are a combination of regular, irregular, and terrorist forces, as well as criminal elements that operate within the local population. 8 The battlefield itself will be non-contiguous with extended LOCs that are subject to interdiction, requiring sustainment forces to use internal assets for self defense, often coined in the field as self-securing. Defense against the hybrid threat enables the sustainment of -Army Forces in austere environments, often at the ends of -Distributed support and sustainment is the capability to provide supplies, personnel, and equipment to decentralized forces across non-contiguous locations, over any distance, and in any combination of offensive, defensive, stability and/or civil support operations to maintain readiness and ensure the freedom of action of the joint forces.‖ 14 Significantly, the Army is also, the joint force executive agent for the -management of land-based water resources in support of contingency operations.‖ 15 As such, the Army is responsible to establish doctrine, training, and execution of all land-based water operations for the joint force. 16 The primary doctrine for army water support operations are Field Manuals 10-52 and 10-52-1. These two echelons of water production and distribution meet the doctrinal requirement to provide overall water support as close to the point of use as possible.
Additionally, the concept significantly reduces the water transportation requirements, especially line-haul requirements, freeing EAB transportation assets to conduct drycargo, distribution-based logistics. 20 Finally, the Army diminishes its reliance on bottled water as a primary source of water consumption.
Whether using bottled water or bulk potable water is immaterial when planning daily water requirements for the force. FM 10-52, Water Supply in Theater Operations, provides a table of planning factors to determine daily water requirements in an arid environment. 21 There are two planning factors; both compute water requirements in gallons per soldier per day. The first is the -minimum‖ planning factor, which includes water -enough for a force to survive up to one week.‖ 22 The second is the -sustaining‖ planning factor which is -requirements exceeding one week.‖ 23 The arid planning factor 6 for -minimum‖ is 6 gallons and -sustaining‖ operations is 13 gallons. 24 All computations for this paper will use the sustaining planning factor. Furthermore, while both OPCON and TACON command relationships imply that the BCT and therefore, the BSB, does not have support responsibility to these units; the reality on the battlefield is the BSB will provide water support for these elements. 37 This additional support requirement further exacerbates the water production shortfall. The fact is as, currently configured; the BSB does not have the capacity to produce enough water on a daily basis to support its BCT organic customer base.
Logistics requirements beyond the BSB's capabilities or capacities -are either furnished by or coordinated through the supporting sustainment brigade.‖ 39 The BSB coordinates with the SBDE to alleviate its water-production shortfall requirement. The SBDE then tasks its subordinate CSSB(s) to provide a daily push of bulk water via truck to the BCT or to provide a water team to augment the BSB's water production capability.
In order to reduce line-haul truck requirements, make the most efficient use of the DBL system, and produce water as close as possible to the user, the optimal means of meeting the BSB's water production shortfall is to augment water purification. The BSB can coordinate with the SBDE Support Operations to provide the augmentation.
The SBDE would task the CSSB to provide the required augmentation from its assigned Modular Quartermaster Water Purification and Distribution Company. 40 There is one, active-duty water purification and distribution company in the Army.
This company with its modular water purification and distribution platoons provides -tailored water production package capabilities, storage, and bulk area distribution at the operational and tactical levels.‖ 41 Each BCT operating in an arid environment will require, at a minimum, a TWPS water purification team to meet the BCT's daily requirement. The augmenting TWPS water team increases the BSB's daily production capacity to 63K per day. It also shows the excess capacity generated by augmenting the BSB with a water production team. This excess capacity will enable the BSB to meet the additional water requirements for area support and or additional command-and-control relationship units previously discussed. Additionally, the excess, depending upon supported population, enables the BSB to provide supply-point water distribution for other services or coalition forces.
In addition to water production augmentation to support the increased water requirement, the BSB also needs water distribution augmentation to support the increased distribution flow to supported units. Water distribution is the metered flow from supporting unit to supported unit and ultimately to individual Soldier. Field Manual 4-90, Brigade Support Battalion, describes this flow in terms of combat loads distributed through Logistics Packages (LOGPACs) to Logistics Release Points (LRPs) from supporting units to supported units. 43 The BCT and Support Brigades continuously 11 maintain three combat loads: one at the organizational unit, one at the Forward Support Company (FSC), and one at the BSB. 44 The SBCT is the exception to this structure.
The SBCT does not have FSCs. The SBCT increased water distribution capability at the BSB and unit levels. 45 Each echelon conducts a daily push of a single combat load to an LRP to resupply the lower echelon to ensure the continuous flow of water to the end user.
The use of the vague term -combat load‖ does not apply the science and mathematics to determine the actual, daily water requirement expressed in gallons per day, especially in an arid and austere environment. Rather, the terminology assumes the organizational and BSB elements can meet the requirement to distribute a combat load. Determining the actual, daily requirement is critical at the unit level; if incorrect, Soldiers suffer.
At the unit level, the primary means to store and distribute water to the individual Soldier is the trailer-mounted, 800-gallon water tank, Unit Pod System (Camel). 46 This system is already replacing the trailer-mounted, 400 gallon M107, M149, M1112 series Water Trailer (Water Buffalo). 47 The basis of issue for this Camel is one per company.
The infantry companies of the SBCT have two Camels per company, to alleviate the lack of an FSC to support the infantry battalions. Providing these assets in direct support to a brigade in an attached or OPCON command relationship negates the dual-use capability of the trucks to provide dry and wet containerized cargo line-haul. Additionally, the CSSB's ability to conduct DBL across the breadth and depth of the battlefield reduces a portion of its cargo-hauling assets by dedicating the cargo-hauling assets to a specific mission for specific units.
The capability reduction to provide reinforcing water production and distribution to the brigade level significantly affects support at the EAB level. The Water Purification and Distribution Company with its subordinate assigned modular water production platoons and storage and distribution platoons provide 360K
gallons of water per day to support EAB units on an area basis. 68 Additionally, the company provides the reinforcing support to the brigades. The 360K gallons of water assumes two production platoons assigned to the company. 69 In FY13 the Army will reduce the number of active-duty water purification and distribution companies from two to one, production platoons from eight to six, and storage and distribution platoons from four to two. 70 This reduction significantly degrades the active-army's capability to provide critical water purification and distribution for contingency operations in an austere, arid environment to EAB units and reinforcing water support to brigades. Additionally, the decrease in active-duty capability makes the Army reliant on the Reserve Component (RC) to provide water purification and distribution for any contingency operation that requires more than seven BCTs and the associated command and control enablers. The figure below depicts the reinforcing and EAB requirements for a seven BCT, with two division HQs and the associated enablers, contingency operation in an austere, arid environment. Any operation requiring more than an estimated seven BCTs, the associated command-and-control and support structure to direct and sustain operations, requires RC forces to achieve the daily water support requirement. The Army is taking extreme risk in its reliance on the RC to provide water purification and distribution to sustain its forces in contingency operations. Given current mobilization policy and processes, RC units require 90-120 days to mobilize and deploy, significantly degrading the Army's ability to conduct short-notice contingency operations. 72 The Army RC has sixteen water purification companies with twenty-five modular purification platoons. Each of these platoons can purify 180K gallons of water a day.
The platoon's modular design enables their dispersion across the battlefield as close to the point of use as possible. The Army has taken significant risk in placing nearly ninety percent of its EAB water purification and eighty-four percent of its EAB transportation capabilities in the RC. 80 In both Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, the Army has mitigated the shortfall in water purification units through a complete reliance on bottled water for personal consumption. Additionally, the Army has mitigated its shortfalls in transportation capacity through extensive contracted and host-nation support. In future contingency operations, in austere, arid environments with extended, non-contiguous LOCs, the Army cannot afford to take this risk.
Recommendations
The first and most critical recommendation is make the BCTs and Support
Brigades self sufficient for water purification and distribution. Adding an additional TWPS to the BSB's water section enables the BSB to meet its supported brigade's daily The final recommendation is to add two augmentation purification platoons to the Active-Component. Adding these two platoons would provide the Army with increased purification capabilities to meet the increased water support requirements at the EAB level in an austere, arid environment. Additionally, these platoons would significantly reduce the reliance on bottled water at the EAB level and enable the army to meet the guidance outlined by Secretary Panetta's quote in the previous paragraph.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the current active-duty water purification and distribution system from the brigade to EAB level is incapable to meet the daily water support requirements of the force to conduct contingency operations in an austere and arid environment. The
BCTs would require reinforcing support from EAB water purification and distribution units to meet the daily water support requirement. Active-duty EAB water purification units lack the capacity to provide both that reinforcing support and meet the areasupport mission requirements for EAB units from the theater to the BCT. Finally, the Army has accepted considerable risk for any operation requiring more than seven BCTs and enablers by relying on RC water purification and distribution to make up for the active-duty shortfall.
The AC's inability to meet its forces' daily water support requirements paints a dismal picture to meet the vision of providing sustained, bulk potable water support for contingency operations as discussed above. Additionally, because the Army is incapable to provide a sustained, metered flow of bulk water within the DBL process, the Army will continue to rely on bottled water for consumption at a cost of $27.9M a year for every BCT.
However, the Army is capable to reconfigure its assets to meet the forces' requirements for bulk water and rethink its plan to inactivate active-duty water-support units. Recapitalizing returning water purification equipment from Iraq and Afghanistan and increasing the distribution capabilities in the BCTs will create self-sufficient BCTs.
A self-sufficient BCT negates the need for bottled water and reinforcing support requirements.
At EAB level, terminating the planned inactivation of active-duty water-support units would provide the ability of EAB, active-duty water units to provide bulk water support, eliminating the need for bottled water. Additionally, retaining the active-duty EAB water-support units creates the flexibility and time to mobilize and deploy RC units.
This retention would reduce the transportation requirement, increasing the capability to move other supplies in the DBL process. Endnotes
